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Too Young to Die:
The Juvenile Death Penalty
After Atkins v. Virginia
Edmund P. Power*
L Imnauaixm
The State of Texas executed Toronto Markey Patterson ("Patterson") on
Wednesday, August 28, 2002.' Patterson grew up in a troubled environment,
whipped by his teenaged mother and surrounded by gangs, drugs and alcohoL2
He sold drugs to provide for basic necessities but he never joined a gang or used
drugs.' In fact, prior to being sentenced to death in 1995 for killing his cousin
Kimberly Stiff Brewer and her two daughters, he had never been convicted and
had no history of violence.4 Patterson was just seventeen years old when the
crime was committed.' Patterson appealed to the United States Supreme Court
to stayhis execution but the Court denied the application because precedent did
not make the execution of seventeen-year-old offenders unconstitutionaL6 Texas
is one of twentytwo states that permit such executions! In an unusual step,
three justices dissented from the denial In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted
"the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international
community against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile
* J.D. Candidate, May2003, Washington and Lee University School of Law;, B.A.,
College of the Holy Cross. The author would like to express his gratitude to his family and
friends, Professor Roger D. Groot and the students in the Viginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
1. Adam Uptak, 3Jtdz C3 Uf5rRemdDe)h S =orfrJuuz, N.Y. TvmS Aug. 30,
2002, at Al.
2. American Bar Association Network, Jumie Danb Peaib; To nto Patmen, awib& at
hrp.i/ww.abane.og/cnjt/juvjus/paterson.htmIl (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
3. Id
4. Id
5. Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. C. 24 (2002) (denying stay of execution).
6. Id at 24.
7. Victor L Strelb, 7heJwmiieDae&Pety Talay Daub Senwm ahdExawiws)foruwnie
Qinz,.rawj,1 1973- Septodar3O, 2002,athttp://wwwaw.onu.edu/facuky/strelb/juvdeath.htm
(Oct. 9,2002).
8. Patuan, 123 S. C. at 24. Five justices must vote to grant a stay whereas four justices
must vote to gran certiorari for the Supreme Court to hear a case. S Herrera v. Collins, 502 US.
1085 (1992) (denying stay of execution despite four justices voting to grant writ of certiorar).
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offender" and that he remained convinced that "the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its the taking of the life of a person as punishment for a crime committed when
below the age of 18."' Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer agreed and stated that
the Court's decision in A zir v v Vih °ga makes possible the reconsideration of
the constitutionality of executing a juvenile offender." Most recently, four
justices dissented from the denial of an application for an original writ of habeas
corpus seeking to declare the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.12 Justice
Stevens, joined byJustices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, found that the rationale
of A tkir applies "with equal or greater force to the execution of juvenile offend-
ers" and that "[w]e should put an end to this shameful practice.""1
InA zim, the Supreme Court held "that the Constitution 'places a substan-
tive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded of-
fender."14 The Court found that the execution of mentally retarded offenders
contradicted evolving standards of decency, did not effectuate the punitive
purposes of capital punishment, and posed a strong risk of wrongful execution.
This Article demonstrates that similar facts plague the juvenile death penaltyand
proposes that that penalty, in light of the Court's decision inA tkim, violates the
Eighth Amendment. In Part II, this Article discusses the development of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and the standard to determine what constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment." Part HI of this Article examines United States
Supreme Court precedent and current state practices regarding the juvenile death
penalty. Part IV discusses the rationale of Azkirm. Part V applies that rationale
to the juvenile death penalty and demonstrates that A tkim requires the deterni-
nation that executing juvenile offenders is unconstitutional
IL T1eE tAn wt
The full text of the Eighth Amendment provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.""5  Early last century in Wm v Unit StaZe,1 6 the United States
Supreme Court expounded on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment when it
stated that it is "a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be gradu-
9. Pamsc, 123 S. C. at 24 (Stevens, J.,.dissenting).
10. 122 S. 0. 2242 (2002).
11. Paomson, 123 S. Cr. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. C. 2242,
2252 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally retarded defendant violates the prohibition
against crueland unusualpunishment of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
12. InreStanford, No. 01-10009,2002 WL 984217 (U.S. Oct. 21,2002) (denying petition for
original writ of habeas corpus). Five justices must vote to grant an ori writ. The author uses
the term juvenile death pentyo refer to death sentences imposed on defendants who were under
the age of eighteen when they committed a capital offense.
13. Id at *1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. A tkin, 122 S. CL at 2252 (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
15. US. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. 217 US. 349 (1910).
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ated and proportioned to the offense."" In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that the cruel and unusual punishments clause is "progressive, and is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened bya humane justice."" Chief Justice Warren rephrased this principle
when he wrote that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignityof man. .. The Amendment must drawits meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."19 Thus, the determination of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual
must investigate whether that punishment is excessive and disproportionate to
the crime as judged by the current societal standards of decency.
The Court has used societal standards of decency to find that the Eighth
Amendment imposes substantive limitations on excessive punishments."
Frequently, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment imposes substantive
limitations against the imposition of capital punishment for certain crimes or on
certain classes of defendants. For example, the Court has held that death is an
impermissibly excessive punishment for rape of an adult woman and also for a
defendant who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor was deliberately
indifferent to the taking of life.21 In 7rborwtp Cn v rAm, 22 the Court found that
the execution of fifteen-year-old murderers violated the Eighth Amendment.'
Most recentlyin A tviv, the Court found that the Eighth Amendment bars the
execution of a mentally retarded defendant convicted of capital murder.24 Thus,
there are various ways in which the death penalty can violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. One of those ways, as in 7Txscn and A zim, is determined by the
characteristics of a class of defendants rather than the actus reus or mens rea of
an individual defendant. Therefore, the methodology of using age as a substan-
tive limitation on capital punishment is proper.
17. Weems v. United States, 217 US. 349,367 (1910) (hoklingthata sentence of twelve ,ars
jailed in irons and at hard labor for the crime of falshiing records constituted cruel and unusual
punishmnt).
18. Id at 378 (citations omitted).
19. Trop .Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,100-01 (1958) (Opinionof Warren, CJ.) (holdingthat Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishment of denationalization).
20. See id; Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660,667 (1962) (holding that imprisonment for
drug addiction violates Eighth Amendment).
21. Tson v. Arizona, 481 US. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that, to receive the death penalty, a
defendant must have a mens rea of at least recldess indifference to humn life and an actus reus of
at least major participation in the l0li4; Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801 (1982) (holding
capital punishment excessive for defendant who lacked intent to kill); Coker v. Geo i a, 433 US.
584, 592 (1977) inion of White, J.) (holding capital punishment excessive for defendant who
committed rape o an adult woman).
22. 487 US. 815 (1988).
23. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that
execution of defendant who was fifteen years old at commission of offense violates Eighth
Amendment).
24. A izm, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
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III The Juwniie DaPeiyBif Atkins:
Thompson, Stanford and Tday
Of the approximately 20,000 known legal executions in American history,
at least 365 of them have been for crimes committed by persons under the age
of eighteen.25 The first such execution took place in 1642; the last occurred when
Texas executed Patterson in 2002.26 Twenty-one of the 365 juvenile executions
have occurred in the modem period of capital punishment- since the Supreme
Court's decision in Fmmm vu Gw 7 The United States Supreme Court has
directlyaddressed the constitutionalityof the juvenile death penaltyin two cases:
7bhnr c v (CYe/hmz and Staufod v AMme y.
During the early morning of January 23, 1983 fifteen-year-old William
Wayne Thompson ("Thompson") and three others killed Thompson's former
brother-in-law Charles Keene ("Keene"), apparent rin retaliation for physical
abuse Keene had inflicted on Thompson's sister. Thompson shot Keene,
kicked him in the head, slit his throat, chained the bodyto a concrete block and
then disposed of it in the Washita River.30 The State of Oklahoma tried Thomp-
son as an adult and a jury convicted him and sentenced him to death.3 ' The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a death
sentence for a fifteen-year-old offender violates the Eighth Amendment. A
plurality of four justices found that such an execution contravened evolving
standards of decency as indicated by the prohibition of the practice by legisla-
tures and the reluctance of juries to impose such sentences.33 The plurality also
noted that the negative opinions of the international community, professional
and religious organizations, and the American public indicated that the execution
of fifteen-year-old offenders was contrary to the current standard of decency.34
Accordingly, the plurality found that the execution of a defendant who was
25. Streib, s"p- note 7, at 2.
26. Id; sewab0 Liptak, s"i'm note 1.
27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238 (1972) (per curium) (holding that Georgia's death
penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and implying that all other death
penalty statutes were unconstrutionaD.
28. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US. 361,372-73 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohlbit the execution of offenders sixteen-years-old or older). Ironiay, the defendant
in this case is the same individual whose appeal for an original writ of habeas corpus was denied by
the Supreme Court in October, 2002, thirteen )ears after it first affirmed his death sentence. Se
Stami 2002 WL 984217, at *1.
29. T7mpar, 487 US. at 819.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id at 818-19.
33. Id at 822-23.
34. Idat 830.
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fifteen at the time of his offense violated the Eighth Amendment."5 Concurring
in the judgment, Justice O'Connor found Thompson's execution improper on
the narrower grounds that Oklahoma's capital sentencing statute did not express
any minimum age at which capital punishment would be improper. 6 This
absence indicated that the Oklahoma Legislature permitted the execution of
fifteen-year-olds "without the earmarks of careful consideration that [the Court
has] required for other kinds of decisions leading to the death penalty.""' Thus,
7bcn holds that a state constitutionally may not sentence to death an of-
fender below the age of sixteen unless the state specifies some minimum age
below which that penalty cannot be imposed. No state permits executions of
those belowthe age of sixteen and 7lwponis generallyunderstood to mean that
the death penalty is unconstitutional for those younger than sixteen.
One year after 77ao, the Court considered whether death sentences for
sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders violated the Eighth Amendment in
Star#a a consolidated appeal of two cases. 8 In the first case, seventeen-year-old
Kevin Stanford ("Stanford") and an accomplice robbed a gas station, raped and
sodomized the attendant, and shot her twice in the head." Kentucky tried
Stanford as an adult and sentenced him to death.' The second case involved
sixteen-year-old Heath Wilkins, sentenced to death in Missouri for killing a
cashier in the course of robbing a convenience store.4 The United States
Supreme Court upheld both sentences and found that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit the death penalty for crimes committed bythose sixteen years
old or older.42 The Court noted that the defendants must show, "not that 17 or
18 is the age at which most persons, or even almost all persons, achieve sufficient
maturityto be held fully responsible for murder, but that 17 or 18 is the age
before which nov can reasonably be held fully responsible."43 As in 7Tx/mpon
the Court examined whether the actions of legislatures and juries indicated a
national consensus and an evolving standard of decency against such execu-
tions.' The Court found no national consensus because a majority of the states
that permitted capital punishment also permitted the juvenile death penalty.45 A
35. 7Thnpcv, 487 U.S. at 838.
36. Id at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Starwif 492 US. at 364-65.
39. Id at 365.
40. Id at 365-66.
41. Id at 366.
42. Id at 380.
43. Id at 376.
44. Stav~bn 492 U.S. at 369. The Court stated, "first among the objective indicia that reflect
the public attitude toward a given sanction are statutes passed bysociety's elected representatives."
Id at 370 (internal citations and brackets omitted).
45. Id at 370-71.
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pluralityof four justices also refused to examine the opinions of the international
community or public opinion for indications of an evolving standard of decency
and stated that socioscientific evidence could not "conclusively establish the
entire lack of deterrent effect [on] and moral responsibility of juvenile
offenders.*' Justice O'Connor again issued a concurring opinion in which she
stressed the Court's constitutional obligation "to judge whether the nexus
between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness is propor-
tional."
47
Thus, after 7xl pcn and Stfon4 the Eighth Amendment does not forbid
the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders. However, the justices
dearly appear to agree on two principles: (1) "there is some age below which a
juvenile's crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death;" and (2) this
age should be located "in light of the evolving standards of decencythat mark the
progress of a maturing society."48 Today, twenty-two states allow the execution
of juvenile offenders.49 As of October 9, 2002, eighty-two persons in fifteen
states were on death row awaiting execution for crimes committed as juveniles.s"
But the standard of decency that permitted the execution of juvenile offenders
has evolved from what it was thirteen years ago when Staj, was decided. This
standard has evolved and must be re-examined. An analysis of the national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty in light of the Court's decision in
A tkim compels the determination that Swi should be overruled, the juvenile
death penaltyis unconstitutional and the sentences of these eighty-two offenders
must be vacated.
IV. Atkins v. Virginia
At midnight on August 16, 1996, Daryl Reynard Atkins ("Atkins") and
William Jones ("Jones") abducted and robbed Eric Nesbitt, took him to an
isolated location and shot him eight times. Atkins and Jones both testified
during Atkins's trial but each blamed the other for the killing. Atkins has an IQ
of fifty- nine and, not surprisingly, the jury found Jones's testimony more
coherent and credible, convicted Atkins, and sentenced him to death."1 The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death sentence because it was "not
willing to commute Atkins' sentence of death to life imprisonment merely
because of his IQ score." 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding
46. Id at 369 n.1, 378.
47. Id at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
48. 7Tknam, 487 US. at 848 (O'Connor, J., coacu ing) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
49. Streib, s"qmz note 7, at 7. Five states set the minimum age for the imposition of the death
penalty at seventeen while seventeen states set that age at sixteen. Id
50. Id at 11.
51. Ad ei, 122 S. . at 2244-45. The defense psychologist testified that Atkins had a full
scale IQ of 59. Id at 2245.
52. Id at 2246 (quoting Commonwealth v. Atkins, 534 S.E2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000)).
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"that the Constitution ' places a substantive restriction on the State's power to
take the life' of a mentally retarded offender." 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied on three lines of reasoning: (1) prevailing standards of decency
forbid the execution of mentally retarded defendants; (2) mentally retarded
defendants "do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the
most serious adult criminal conduct" and therfore do not warrant a death
sentence; and (3) mentallyretarded defendants are less capable of assisting in and
securing the type of defense required in capital cases and therefore present an
increased chance of death sentences being imposed on defendants who did not
actually commit a capital offense.-"
V. A fnmSrfi Ak i
Facts regarding juvenile offenders are directlyanalogous to the facts regard-
ing mentally retarded offenders that supported the three lines of reasoning in
A tkim. These facts compel the conclusion that executing juvenile offenders is
cruel and unusual punishment. First, facts similar to those that demonstrated an
evolving standard of decency against the execution of the mentally retarded also
demonstrate such a standard against the execution of juvenile offenders. Second,
juvenile offenders, like the mentally retarded, are less capable and less culpable
than adult offenders and therefore do not warrant the most severe punishment
of death. Third, juveniles possess characteristics similar to those of the mentally
retarded that undermine the procedural safeguards that the Constitution requires
for the imposition of the death penalty.
A. E'fdrStwdv jDomry
1. L e wslatieardJuidlPrroap n adxJw ieDahPmty
The "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values
is the legislation enacted bythe country's legislatures."" s Accordingly, the A tkim
Court looked at legislative action as the main factor that determines whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual.
[The large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legisla-
tion reinsating the power to conduct such executions) pmvides pow-
erful evidence that todayour societyviews mentalyretarded offefiders
as categorically less culpable that the average criminal.6
53. Id at 2252 (quoting Fon, 477 US. at 405).
54. Id at 2244.
55. Pemyv. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302,331 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not preclude the execution of the mentally retarded by virtue of their mental retardation alone).
56. A krz, 122 S. C. at 2249.
2002]
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Thus, if a large number of states proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders,
that fact is an indication that society views such defendants as less culpable and
that their executions would be cruel and unusual. In A tkin, the Court found a
national consensus indicated bythe fact that thirty-one jurisdictions (thirtystates
and the federal government) banned the execution of the mentally retarded."'
The number of states that ban the execution of juvenile offenders parallels the
number of states that banned the execution of the mentally retarded. Today,
twelve states do not provide the death penalty at all Of the thirtyeight states
that authoize capital punishment, fifteen have statutes that proscribe executions
of juvenile offenders."' Additionally, the Supreme Court of the State of Washing-
ton judicially banned such executions. 9 The federal government also sets the
minirmun age for the imposition of the death penalty at eighteen.' Thus,
twenty-eight states and the federal government forbid the execution of juvenile
offenders. This number, although two short of the number of states in A tki,
indicates a national consensus and a standard of decency against the juvenile
death penalty.
The Court in A tinr noted that, in determining the national consensus, "[i]t
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency
of the direction of change."6  Developments since Stfo'niin 1989 have been
57. Id at 2248. Staw d did not include non-death states in the calculation of states that did
not permit the execution of the juvenile offenders because it found that these states had not
considered what was the appropriate minimum age for the imposition of capital punishnenL
Srrot4 492 US. at 370 n.2. This reasoning is mistaken because a state that determines all forms
of capital punishmen are inappropriate necessarily determines that the juvenile death penalty is
inappropriate. A tis differed from Staqfri by including non-death states in the calculation of
states that did not permit the execution of the mentally retarded. Therefore, in determining the
existence of a national consensus, the A tkim rationale should applyand computations of states that
ban the juvenile death penalty should include states that ban all forms of the death penalty.
58. The following states statutorily preclude death sentences for offenders under eighteen
California (CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. $ 190.5(a) (West 1999)); Colorado (OLo. REV. STAT. S 16-11-
103 (Supp. 1996)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. S 53a-46a(h)(1) (2001));Illinois (720 ILL COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 2002)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-2-3(2) (Michie
2002)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. S 21-4622 (1995)); Maryland (NM. CODE ANN., GuM. LAW S 2-
202(b)(2)(i) (2002)); Montana (MoNr. CODE ANN.§ 45-5-102(2) (2001)); Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. S 28-105.01(1) (2000)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §5 2A.4A-22(a) (West Supp. 2002),
2011-3(g) (West Supp. 2002)); New Mexico (NaM STAT. ANN. SS 28-6- 1(A) (Mlchie Supp. 2000),
31-18-14(A) (lichie Supp. 2000)); NewYork(N.Y.PENALS 125.27(1)(b) (McKinneySupp. 2002));
Ohio (OHIOREV. CODE ANN. SS 2929.023 (West 1997), 2929.03 (West 1997)); Oregon (ORE. REV.
STAT. S 137.707 (2001)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. SS 37-1-102(4) (Supp. 2002), 37-1-103
(2001), 37-1-134(a)(1) (2001)).
59. State v. Furman, 858 P2d 1092,1103 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (holding that juvenile court
statute and death penalty statute allowed for possibility of executing offender under the age of
sixteen in violation of 7bwpr and that death sentence could not be imposed pursuant to the two
statutes on offender under the age of eighteen)
60. 18 US.C S 3591(b) (2000) (prohibiting federal execution of eighteen-year.olds); 21 U.S.C
S 848(l) (2000) (prohibiting federal execution of eighteen-year-olds).
61. A tinE, 122 S. C. at 2249.
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uniformly against executing juvenile offenders. Montana raised its minimum
death-eligible age to eighteen in 1999 and Indiana followed suit in 2002.' When
New York reinstated its death penaltyin 1995, it set the minimum age at eigh-
teen.63 Kansas's 1994 enactment of the death penalty also set the mininmm age
for a death-eligible offender at eighteen." The Supreme Court of Washington
effectivelyabolished the juvenile death penaltyin 1993.65 In addition to the states
that have forbidden juvenile executions since Star#on, legislation to ban such
executions has been introduced in ten other states.6 No state has sought or
instituted legislation to lower the minimum age for capital offenders below
eighteen.67 These facts indicate that the standard of decencyhas evolved consis-
tently in a direction away from the execution of juvenile offenders.
In Adeim, the Court attempted to distinguish the level of the national
consensus against executng the mentallyretarded from that of executing juvenile
offenders by noting that, since 1988, eighteen states passed statutes proscribing
the execution of the mentally retarded whereas only two states had raised the
threshold age for the imposition of death." This analysis is mistaken for two
reasons. First, it ignores both the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington
and the fact that New York and Kansas forbade the practice when theyinstituted
capital punishment statutes. Second, before 1988, no state banned the execution
of the mentallyretarded whereas twelve states had laws forbidding the execution
of defendants who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen. 9 That is,
in 1988, the countrywas closer to a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty than it was to one against the execution of the mentally retarded. The
new decisions of just a few states to ban juvenile executions raise the total of
such states to parallel that of A Aim and are enough to demonstrate a shift to a
national consensus against that practice.
As further evidence of an evolving standard of decency, legislation prohibit-
ing the juvenile death penalty "ca r es even greater force when it is noted that the
legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelminglyin favor of
the prohibition." Legislatures that recently have addressed the proper age for
a death eligible offender have voted overwhelmingly to set that age at eighteen.
The vote against the juvenile death penaltyin Indiana was 44-3 in the Senate and
62. MONT. CbDE ANN. 45-5-102(2) (2001); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-50-2-3(2) (fichie 2002).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAwS 12527(1)(b) (McKinneySupp. 2002).
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 21-4622 (1995).
65. Fwmv, 858 P.2d at 1103.
66. Streib, s"- note 7, at 5. In the last two years, bills were proposed in the following states
to raise the minimum age for capital offenders to eighteen: Arizona; Arkansas; Florida; Kentucky,
Mlississippi; lissouri; Nevada; Pennsyvania; South Dakota; and Texas. I at 6.
67. Id at 6.
68. Atkuiy, 122 S. C0. at 2249 n.18.
69. Stafon 492 U.S. at 370 a.2.
70. A tirs, 122 S. C. at 2249.
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83-10 in the Assembly.71 The Montana prohibition passed 44-5 in the Senate and
85-15 in the Assembly.' In 2002, the Florida Senate voted 34-0 to ban the
juvenile death penalty but the House of Representatives did not vote on the
measure before the end of the session; the Florida House of Representatives had
approved the measure in 2001." The Texas House passed its bill 72-42 before
the legislation stalled in the Senate. 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton was unanimous in its decision that abolished the juvenile death penalty.
2. Samity ofd Inl xmo f djw le IDath Peidy
In A tim, the scarcity of executions of the mentally retarded was another
factor that indicated the national consensus against the practice.
t appears that even among those States that regularly execute of-
enders and that have no prohibition with regard to the mentally
retarded, only five have excuted offenders possessing a known IQ
less than 70 since [1989]. The practice, therefore, has become truly
unusual and it is fair to say thai a national consensus has developed
against it."
The small number of states that have executed juvenile offenders parallels that
of states that have executed the mentally retarded. Only seven states have
executed a juvenile since 1972 and only six states have done so since 1989.
Furthermore, in states that have executed juvenile offenders, such executions are
extremelyrare. Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Carolina each
have executed only one juvenile offender.' Only Texas and Virginia have
executed more than one juvenile offender with Texas responsible for thirteen
such executions and Virginia responsible for three." In other words, if Texas
and Virginia are removed from the calculation, just five juvenile offenders have
been executed in the United States since 1972.
71. Appellant's Suggestions as to the Applicability of A tkr v V'gizia to the Issues in Mr.
Simmons' Case, a httpJ/www.abanr.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmomnsatUm.pdf (July20, 2002), at
34 [hereinafter Appellant's Suggestions in Mr. Simmons' Case].
72. Id
73. American Bar Association, 7he Jumrde Daaz Peaty in the Unritd Sots, a
http'./www.abanet.org/cnust/juvjus/jdpfactsheetO2.pdf (July2002) [hereinafter ABAJuvenile
Death Penalty].
74. Applellant's Suggestions in Mr. Simmons' Case, sqra note 71, at 34.
75. Fwmv; 858 P2d at 1093.
76. A rik, 122 S. a. at 2249 (footnote omitted).
77. Streib, stm note 7, at 3-4. Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia
have executed juvenile offenders since 1989. South Carolina executed seventeen-ycar-old J. Terry
Roach in 1986.
78. Id at 3-4. The single executions in these states were the first since 1957 for Georgia, 1948
for Louisiana, 1921 for Missouri, and 1948 for South Carolina. Before 1999, Oklahoma never had
executed a juvenile offender. Id
79. Id
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Additionally, death sentences byjuries for juvenile offenders are scarce and
this scarcity indicates a national consensus against the practice." Historically,
death sentences have been rare for juvenile offenders. Delaware, Idaho, New
Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming have never sentenced to death,
let alone executed, a juvenile offender despite permitting the imposition of such
sentences.81 Three states are responsible for roughly half of the 219 juvenile
death sentences since 1972.82 Juvenile death sentences comprised 2.7 percent of
all death sentences in 2001 and 1.2 percent of all death sentences thus far in
2002."' Presently there are eighty-two juvenile offenders on death row in only
fourteen of the twenty-two states that permit the juvenile death penalty."* Texas
has the largest number of juvenile offenders on death row with twentyeight, or
one third of the total in the nation."5 Thus, death sentences for juvenile offend-
ers are rare or unusual and occur only in a few, isolated states. The practice of
these states does not indicate national acceptance of the juvenile death penalty,
but rather directly contradicts the national consensus against it as is indicated by
the practice of the many states that do not permit or do not impose such sen-
tences.
Even in Vuginia, the only state other than Texas to execute more than one
juvenile offender, it is uncommon for a jury to sentence a juvenile to death.
Virginia has sentenced only five juvenile offenders to death. 6 Justice Hassell of
the Supreme Court of Virginia dissented from the opinion upholding the sen-
tence of ChauncyJackson, the only sixteen-yea.'-old offender among these five,
because the sentence was "excessive and disproportionate" for killers of the
defendant's age. 7 Justice Hassell noted that nine other sixteen-year-old offend-
ers had pleaded to or been convicted of capital murder but the death sentence
80. In 77;wpcp, Justice Stevens noted that the scarcity of jury verdicts imposing death
sentences on fiteen-yLar-old defendants indicated that the practice is now generally abhorrent to
the conscience of the community.", hmwtr, 487 US. at 832. Chief Justice Rehnquist also has
noted that data concerning the actions of sentencing juries ... is a significant and reliable index
of contemporary vahes .. because of the jurys intimate involvement in the case and its flnction
of'maintaining a link between contemporarycommunkyvalues and the penal system." A tkii, 122
S. CL at 2253 (Rehnquist, CIJ, dissenting) (internal quotations, citations and brackts omitted).
81. Strelb, sq note 7, at 14-19.
82. Id at 9. Fi six juveniles have been sentenced to death in Texas, thirty-one in Florida,
and twenrttwo in Albam. Id
83. Id at 9.
84. Id at11.
85. Id at 26.
86. Id at 10. Virginia juries have sentenced the followi five juveniles to death: Doug Chris
Thomas (executed 2000), Dwayne A. Wright (executed 1998), Steve E. Roach (executed 2000),
ChaunceyJacison (reversed 2000),Shermaine Johnson (reversed 2001, re-sentenced 2002, pending
final sentencing October 2002). Id at 18-20.
87. Jacksonv. Commonweakh, 499 S.E.2d 538,557 (Va. 1998) (Hassefl,J., dissenting inpart
and concurring in part).
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was imposed only in Jackson's case."8 In addition to the cases noted by Justice
Hassell, Virginia juries have imposed life sentences on at least three additional
juvenile offenders after convicting them of capital murder.8 The life sentences
of these twelve juveniles indicate that, even in the state with the second highest
number of executions of juvenile offenders, juries predominantly choose to
sentence juveniles to life imprisonment rather than death.
3. A dditil Fatos I i t* g d Jawt em Deith Peky
Ccntradia dr Sar~id qfDexnry
a. IntenaiavJ Nam
The United States Supreme Court has found that the opinion of the interna-
tional community is relevant to the determination of evolving standards of
decency.'* International opinion is relevant to a national consensus because the
consistency of that opinion "with the legislative evidence lends further support
to [the] conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed
the issue."9" The A tki Court considered this factor and noted that "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."92 World opinion
indicates the same overwhelming disapproval of the juvenile death penalty.
Presently, the United States is one of just three nations that support the juvenile
death penalty. The other two are Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo.9'
In the last ten years, China, Pakistan and Yemen have joined the vast majority of
88. Id at 555-57.
89. Additional juvenile offenders convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment in Virginia are: WalterJ. Keil, (sixteen years old), sieKiel v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 826
(Va. 1981); Stephen M. Sneade (sixteen years old), see Sneade v. Commonwealth, No. 1105-99-2,
2000 WL 1486567 (Va. Ct. App. Oct 10, 2000) (the jury found both aggravating factors of future
dnerousness and vileness); Lorenzo McLean, (seventeen )ears old), sw McLean v. Common-
w 516 S.E.2d 717 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc) (the jur found both aggravating factors of
future dangerousness and vileness). SeLife Sentence Project (Oct. 2002) (unpublished mnuscript,
on fie with the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse) (compiling list of defendants convicted of
capital murder in Virginia and sentenced to life imprisonment).
90. 7mpor 487 US. at 830.
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decencyto execute a person
who was less that 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent I the
vie ws that have been expressed by... other nations that share our lAmerican
heritage, and bythe leading members of the Western European community.
Id Other United States Supreme Court cases have recognized the relevance of international
opinion to determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. See EmnmA 458 US. at
796-97 n.22; Coker, 433 US. at 596 n.10; Trqp, 356 US. at 103.
91. Atkin, 122 S. Ct. at 2250 n.21.
92. Id The relevance of these factors indicates a retum to the 7Thvpmn rationale and a move
away from the Stairfd rationale that found these factors inapposite.
93. DeathPenaltyInformationCenter, Ex aiqJmouzrile( , U.S. HistoiBadennrw
audaUeat http://www.deathpenahyinfo.org/rvexec.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
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nations prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.' Furthermore, the
United States is the world's leading executioner of juvenile offenders and has
executed more juvenile offenders than all other nations combined." The Euro-
pean Union, United Nations, Mexico, France and other countries have con-
demned the use of the juvenile death penalty in the United States.96
Multilateral treaties also manifest the international community's revulsion
to the juvenile death penalty by expressly forbidding the practice.' The United
States has been almost alone in not supporting treaties that prohibit the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders. The United States and Somalia are the onlycountries
that have not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
which prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders."8 Furthermore, the United
States Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("I(CPR7) but reserved the right to impose capital punishment for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age, contrary to Article six,
paragraph five of the Covenant." Courts have refused to find that the ICCXR
bars the execution of juvenile offenders, but the vast international support for
the treatyindicates the near universal opposition to the juvenile death penalty.10°
Indeed, the extent of the international opposition mayindicate that a prohibition
94. ABAJuvenile Death Penalty, s"m note 73. It is ironic that many of the nations that find
the juvenie death penalty abhorrent are nations that the United States cites for civil rights abuses.
95. Id
96. Id
97. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tme of War,
6 US.T. 3516, opm/ifor szmmne Aug. 12, 1949; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577
U .TS. 3, md irmf M Sept. 2,1990; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
UN.T.S. 171, 4a wnfsi Mar. 7, 1966. A "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed bypersons below eighteen years of age.* Id art. 6, para. 5.
98. American Bar Association Network,]JamiDe Pueudt TavrtPatkmsc, ssma note 2.
Iran and Congo impose the juvenile death penalty despite having ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
s"~mr note 97, at 3.
99. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying certificate of
appealabiliy for claim that I(XPRprohibit sition of death sentence for defendants less than
eighteen years of age). The governments of Belgiun, Denmark, Fitland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden objected to the Senate's reservations. See
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretazyGeneral, Status as of 31 December, 1994, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13, 127-30 (1995).
100. In Benzej the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's claims that the I(XPRprohibited the
execution of juvenile offenders. Baize); 242 F.3d at 267. The defendant contended that: (1) article
6(5) of the ICCPR voided the Texas statute that prnitted death sentences for seventeen-year-old
defendants; and (2) the Senate's reservation to t I(XOPR was void. Id The court found these
arguments were barred procedurally but concluded that the Senate's reservation was valid. Id
Additionally, two state supreme courts held that the Senate's reservation is valid and that the I(flR
does not supersede state law to prevent the execution of juvenile offenders. S&Ex panPressley,
770 So2d 143, 148 (AL 2000); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998), at denaz
528 US. 963 (1999).
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against the execution of those under eighteen has achieved jus cogens status as
a peremptory, nonderogable norm of general international law from which the
United States cannot exempt itself.1 Most importantly, the strength of the
international opinion indicates that, among those who have addressed the issue,
there is a consensus that eighteen is the proper minimum age for a capital
offender.
b Cpim' cfPrfsiw and Rdigwi Ozeaia=
and Pdi Data
A Aim also considered the opinions of religious, social and professional
organizations with germane expertise as indicative of a national consensus.10 2
Numerous organizations oppose the juvenile death penalty. The American Bar
Association has adopted a resolution opposing the juvenile death penalty.0 '
Similarly, the American Law Institute in S 210.6 of the Model Penal Code pro-
posed excluding juvenile offenders from the death penalty, the commentary
notes that "civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of the execution of
children.""° In June of 2001, the Constitution Project, a group that includes
advocates and opponents of capital punishment, released a report that included
a recommendation to end the juvenile death penalty.' Other professional
organizations opposing the juvenile death penaltyinclude: the American Psychi-
atric Association, the American Academyof Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the
American Societyfor Adolescent Psychiatry, the National Mental Health Associa-
tion, the Cildren's Defense Fund, the Center on Juvenile Criminal Justice, the
Child Welfare League of America, the Juvenile Law Center and the Urban
League." Numerous religious organizations also oppose the juvenile death
101. Jus cogens is defined as a "mandatory norm of general international law from which no
two or more nations mayexempt themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAWDICIONARY
864 (7th ed. 1999). Sa; eg, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,717 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the prohibition against torture had achieved jus cogens status). SeeChristian
A. Levesque, Note, TheInonwinalCorvwzonCitdziPditadRizs: A PrirwforRaisingaDwe
Agzinst deJuwneDatbPaayinFatmlCaut, 50 Ai U. L REV. 755, 765-66 (2001) (describing
the applicability of the jus cogens doctrine for raising a defense to the juvenile death penalty.
102. A tis, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.21.
103. American Bar Association, Summary of Action of the House of Delegates 17 (1983
Annual Meeting). 'Be it resolved that the American Bar Association opposes, in principle, the
imposition of capital punishment upon anyperson for any offense committed while under the age
of eighteen (18)." Id
104. MODEL PENAL C)DE S 210.6, Commentary, 133 (1980).
105. CNN.com, Pand/ Ca&l For Rtform to Deatb Pmlty Syst, at
htp://www.cna.com/2001/LAW/06/27/death.penay.reform/index.html (June 27,2001). The
bipartisan Constitution Project included former judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officials,
religious leaders and victims-rights advocates.
106. See American Bar Association, Tbenjie Death Panlr Cbr rSi nm ,  uriA a edat
htrp'./wwwabaneLorg/crimjust/juvjus/simmnsxtmI (last visited Nov. 112002) (listing organiza-
tions supporting clemency petition of Christopher Simmons, juvenile offender currently awaiting
imposition of death sentence in Missoun).
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penalty including: the American Baptist Churches, American Friends Service
Committee, American Jewish Comnittee, American Jewish Congress, Disciples
of Christ, Mennonite Central Committee, General Assemblyof the Presbyterian
Church and the United States Catholic onference.0 Moreover, opinion polling
data indicate that the vast majority of Americans oppose the juvenile death
penalty.0 8 A Gallup poll from May 2002 indicates that, despite seventy-two
percent in favor of the death penalty overall, sixty-nine percent of Americans
oppose the juvenile death penalty while onlytwenty-six percent support it.' s A
poll bythe Houston Chronicle reported similar results."' Thus, legislative action,
the scarcity of juvenile death sentences and executions, and the opinion of the
international community, professional and religious organizations, and the
American public demonstrate a resounding national consensus and a standard of
decency that has evolved against the imposition of the juvenile death penalty.
B. The Juw e Dahb Pemity Doe Not Sere the Pupr/ss jc1 i Puishrn
1. Juwnile (ffinde A mL es Qdpalie 7lan Adukt (ffiien
"[Tihe severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the
culpability of the offender," and the United States Supreme Court will "set aside
a death sentence because the petitioner's crimes [do] not reflect a consciousness
materially more depraved than that of any person guilty of murder."' Indeed,
the Court followed this rationale in A tkE when it found that the reduced
capabilities of the mentally retarded made them less culpable and therefore
undeserving of death sentences.
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
irfipairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reason-
ing, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others
107. StarfinA 492 US. at 388 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting religious organizations filing
amicus briefs for petitioners).
108. A &iri found that"polling data sows a widespread consensus among Americans... that
executing the mentally retarded is wrong." A rzm, 122 S. CL at 2250 n21.
109. JefferyM Jones, Gallu Pdi) lrDptb A rnye, Sqtwx for t Dath Pny n IrI&a
Cmtan at http://www.galup.com/poll/analysis/iaO20830ix.asp (Aug. 2002). The Gallup poll
defined juveniles as those under twenty-one )ears of age.
110. Steve Brewer,Jumi1eGzos:JtI in 4 in Ca ry T s DaabA ppmpiate HOUS. Q-RON.,
Feb. 6,2001, at 13, auila/eat http://www.chronbcom/cs/CDA/printstry.hts/metropolkian/
816391 (last visited Nov. 14,2002). "[A]mongpeople who otherwise believe in capital punishment,
just 26 percent said they would support executing someone who was a juvenile at the time of
offense." Id
111. A tkins, 122 S. CL at 2251 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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.... Their deficiencies do not warnant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability
12
The national consensus against the juvenile death penalty likely indicates a
recognition that juveniles, like the mentally retarded, do not possess the same
level of knowledge, experience and self control as adults possess. The United
States Supreme Court recognized these diminished capabilities of fifteen-year-
olds in 7upon when it noted that, "[i]nexperience, less education, and less
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.""' The Court has also stated
that, "youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time of life when a person
maybe the most susceptible to influence and psychological damage."" 4
Recent physiological, social and psychological research supports the conclu-
sion that these statements apply equally to sixteen and seventeen-year-old
offenders. For example, one recent study indicated that juveniles engage in
increased risk-taking behavior due to the developmental changes that take place
in the brain during adolescence.' In this study, researchers compared Magnetic
Resonance Imaging scans of youths from the ages of eleven through seventeen
to adults."6 The scans demonstrated that youths process emotional information
in the amygdala, a region that guides impulse related behavior, whereas adults
process the information in the frontal lobe, a region that conducts thought,
planning and goal-directed behavior."7 Accordingly, the functional capabilities
of the brains of juveniles maymake them less able to control impulses and more
prone to act on instinct. Additional factors negatively impact the decision-
making ability of juveniles, making them less able to make reasoned decisions.
Juveniles are more susceptible to peer influence than adults." 8 Research indicates
that juveniles take more health and safety risks than adults do by engaging in
112. Id at 2250-51 (footnote omitted).
113. 71xpcr&, 487 US. at 835.
114. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US. 104, 115-17 (1982) (vacating death sentence imposed
without the individualized consideration of mitigating factors as required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments). Eddings was sixteen years old at the time of his offense. The Supreme
Court did not consider whether the death sentence was cruel and unusual because of Eddings's age
but rather addressed the sentencer's failure to consider the mitigating circumstances of the defen-
dant's history of a difficult family and emotional disturbance. Id at 113 n.9.
115. Frontline, Irid de Tw Brn Imnieew Wh Ddemh/ Yw o Tod (PhD, Director of
Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neurommaging at Mclean Brain Imaging Center) ataie a




118. Elizabeth S. Scott &Thomas Grisso, 7heE qim A dolaww A Dewtdn Pespeaiw
cnJmukd i w Rqr 88 J. QRU L. &ORMINOLOGY 137, 162 (1997).
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behavior such as unprotected sex, drunk driving and criminal conduct."' Fur-
thermore, juvenile decision-making is overly focused on short-term rather than
long-term consequences of the considered actions. 20 Also, "the fact that delin-
quent behavior desists for most adolescents as theyapproach adulthood strongly
suggests that criminal conduct, for most youths, is associated with factors
peculiar to adolescence." 21 Thus, these diminished capabilities are functions of
age ratherthan characteristics of individual juveniles, and these limitations should
make juveniles less culpable, as a class, than adults. These diminished capabilities
of juveniles are directly analogous to the diminished capabilities of the mentally
retarded that served to decrease their level of culpability as found bythe Court
inA &im. Therefore, juveniles should be sinilarlyless culpable and ineligible for
the death penalty.
"[P]unishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal defendant" and if juveniles are less culpable than adults, theyshould face
a less severe punishment.' Various jurisdictions recognize that the diminished
capabilities of juveniles lower their culpability and ability to act responsibly in
many non-criminal contexts. 21 "The rasons whyjuveniles are not trusted with
the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain whytheir irresponsible
conduct is not as morallyreprehensible as that of an adult."' 24 Criminal laws also
account for these reduced capabilities and hold juveniles less culpable. This fact
is illustrated in the holdings of L adetv Qbi 2 and Eddir v kb/a/ 26 andthe
capital sentencing statutes of many states that require juries to consider youth as
a factor that mitigates a defendant's culpability.
2
119. Id at 163.
120. Id at 164.
121. Id at 172.
122. 7wxpm, 487 US. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 US. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
123. Id at 823. For example, laws restrict a juvenile's ability to enter binding contracts, be
found liable for torts, and to vote, hold office and serve on a jury. The TwentySixth Amendment
requires states to permit eighteen-year-olds to vote. US. COn. amend. XXVI. No state has
lowered its voting age below eighteen. In no state may anyone below the age of eighteen serve on
a jury. 71xknp, 487 US. at 840-42.
124. Idat 835.
125. 438 US. 586 (1978).
126. 455 US. 104 (1982).
127. Lodet v Chi, 438 US. 586 (1978) (holding that all aspects of the offender's character
and record must be considered before imposing the death penat); Eding, 455 US. at 115-16; sw
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (M[hie 2000). o tts death sentence was improper in part
because, under the Ohio capital sentencing statute, consideration of defendant's ... age, would
generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing decision." Lod, 438 US. at 608.
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2. Ddm&=etRar tb t
The decreased culpability and capabilities of juveniles significantly impact
the punitive purposes of capital punishment. The A tkim Court identified
deterrence and retribution as the punitive purposes of capitalpunishment.' The
Court noted that, unless the imposition of the death penalty" measurablycontib-
utes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punish-
ment."129 The Court struck down the execution of mentally retarded offenders
in part because there was a "serious question" whether the social purposes of the
death penalty were advanced by such executions.13
"The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the
notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors
from carrying out murderous conduct.""' In A tkim, the Court noted that the
"cognitive and behavioral impairments" of the mentally retarded, including a
"diminished abilityto understand and process information, to learn from experi-
ence, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses," made it less likely
that a mentally retarded defendant would realize the possibility of the death
penaltyand be deterred bythat possibility.3  The juvenile death penakydoes not
fulfill the purpose of deterrence because juveniles, as noted in Part V(B)(1), share
manyof the same cognitive and behavioral impairments as the mentallyretarded.
Specifically, the propensity of juveniles to act on impulse and their general failure
to consider long-term consequences demonstrate that juveniles are not capable
of being deterred because they either cannot or do not consider the possibility
that their actions will result in a death sentence. As the Court noted in 7hcwrapC
because of these cognitive and behavioral impairments, "[t]he likelihood that the
teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexis-
tent."' Moreover, even if juveniles are capable of being deterred, the juvenile
death penalty may not actually deter these offenders from committing murder
because it is imposed so infrequently. In other words, the notion of the juvenile
death penalty as an effective deterrent fails because it wrongly assumes that
juveniles are deterred by the very few executions of sixteen and seventeen-yEar-
old offenders that have occurred during the modem period of capital punish-
ment.
t 34
128. A tkim, 122 S. a. at 2251.




133. 7Tthi p, 487 US. at 837.
134. Id at 838. Furthermore, because juveniles commit such a small percentage of nuders,
any general deterrent value of capital punishment should not be affected by their exemption from
capital punishment. Not putting juveniles to death would not incite adults to kill. Crime statistics
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The juvenile death penaltymaywork retributive justice but such retribution
is both excessive and ignores the penological purpose of reformation. Retribu-
tion is society's "interest in seeing that the offender gets his 'just desserts'-- the
severityof the te punishment necessarilydepends on the culpabilityof
the offender."3 s Capitalpunishment is appropriately severe onlywhen a defen-
dant's crime reflects "a consciousness materiallymore 'depraved' than that of any
person guilty of murder."'3 6 In A tkim, the Court stated that if "the culpability
of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender
surely does not merit that form of retribution."' This rationale applies equally
in the case of the less culpable juvenile offender. Furthermore, in TAcarpn,
Justice Stevens explained that the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender did not
further the purpose of retribution "[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile
offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations
to its children."' Retribution should not apply to juvenile offenders because
society views, and social and psychological evidence demonstrates, that such
offenders have the same lesser culpabilitythat fifteen-year-old offenders had at
the time of 7mrcr Such a punishment, as Justice Stevens noted, would also
ignore juveniles's capacity for growth and society's fiduciary obligations to
juveniles.
C Rei4mi CpAies qltenila and Ptmmhff
Fa4V in Coizi Prwwda
The potential harm of an improper death sentence is tremendous because
"the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long."3 9 Because the penalty is irreversible, "there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliabilityin the determination that death is the appro-
priate punishment in a specific case.""4 Accordingly, the Constitution requires
that death sentences be determined reliably. Death is never the appropriate
indicate that the vast majorityof murders are committed bythose over eighteen. In 2000, juveniles
committed 832 of 14,697, or 6.8 percent, of all murders and non-negligent manslaughters. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Qintrin UthieStza, Ur ,mOin Retw Seainl, Cri e Iir, QJne
P mr at 17 (2000) auiahieat http.J/wwwb*igov/ucr/Cius 00/O0cime2.pdf (last visited Nov.
11,2002). If juvenile murderers are no longer death eligible,-that portion of the 93.2 percent of
murderers who kill indeath penalty states, knowing the death penalty still applies to them, may still
be deterred by that penalty.
135. Atkim, 122 S. O. at 2251.
136. Gafm.% 446 US. at 433.
137. A kem, 122 S. O. at 2251.
138. 7ipt s 487 US. at 836-37.
139. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) (Opinion of Stewart, J.) (holding
that mandatory death sentence statute violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
140. Id at 305.
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sentence for a juvenile offender because such a reliable determination is not
possible.
The high reversal rate of juvenile death sentences indicates the unreliability
of such sentences."' There have been 221 juvenile death sentences since the
modem period of capital punishment began in 1972.142 Of these, eighty-two
remain in force and are being litigated; final resolution has occurred in 139 cases,
through execution, reversal or commutation.' Executions occurred in twenty-
one of the finally resolved cases and two juvenile death sentences were com-
muted.'" One hundred sixteen juvenile death sentences have been reversed.'
Therefore, the reversal rate for juvenile death sentences is eightythree percent.'4'
This high rate demonstrates that the vast majority of juvenile offender death
sentences have been sed wrongly.
The constitutionally required reliability is absent from juvenile death sen-
tences because juvenile defendants, like the mentallyretarded, are less capable of
assisting in the conduct of an adequate defense. In A tkim, the Court noted that
the reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders created the "risk 'that the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty."" 47 Constitutional protections serve to ensure that the death penalty is
not imposed when a less severe punishment is appropriate but the cognitive and
behavioral impairments that make juveniles less culpable also make them less
capable of understanding and invoking these safeguards. For example, research
shows that juveniles have trouble understanding Minva warnings.'" Juveniles
waive their rights to silence and counsel and make statements regarding sus-
pected felonies approximatelyninetypercent of the time as compared to approxi-
matelysixtypercent of the time for adult suspects. 14' If juveniles cannot under-
stand and invoke their constitutional rights then procedural safeguards are
absent, the chances for fair trials decrease while the chance of mistaken convic-
tions increase and the reliabilitythat the Constitution requires of death sentences
becomes an impossibility.
In addition, the inability of mentally retarded defendants to understand and
invoke their constitutional rights led to another fact that indicated the cruel and
141. SeeStreib, sirm note 7, at 8.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id The death sentences of Judith Neelleyand AlexanderWiliams were commuted. Id
at 16-17.
145. Id at 8.
146. Id
147. Ad&z, 122 S. C. at 2251 (quoting LodSA 438 US. at 605).
148. Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, WhmMdid Qutimn (Mm A wPrnectia Ad dapi&,
1 J. CUNMR FOR GULD. &Crs. 151, 155 (1999).
149. Id Kaban and Tobey propose that juveniles waive tbeir ight more frequent than
adults because of increased vulnerability to coercive pressures of adult authority figures and
youthfu failure to consider long-term consequences. Id
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unusual nature of death sentences for mentally retarded offenders: the "disturb-
ing number" of exonerated death row inmates including "mentally retarded
persons who unwittingly confessed to crimes that they did not commit.""
These "disturbing" false confessions also frequently occur with juvenile sus-
pects. For example, sixteen-year-old Johnny Ross confessed to a capital rape
charge and was sentenced to death in Louisiana in 1975.'1 DNA evidence
cleared Ross in 1980.152 In 1986, seventeen-year-old Marcellius Bradford agreed
to testify against co-defendants in a murder/rape case in exchange for a twelve-
year sentence. DNA evidence exonerated all defendants in 2001.' Seventeen-
year-old Mario Hayes confessed to a murder in 1996 but was acquitted at trial
after jail records indicated that he had been incarcerated at the time of the
murder." Sixteen-year-old Don Olmetti spent two years in jail after he con-
fessed to shooting and killing a woman but Illinois ultimately dropped the
murder charge because he had an alibi."' A final example of this problem brings
us back to the case of Toronto Patterson.
Patterson signed two different statements during his interrogation.1 16 Inthe
first, he admitted to being present at the crime scene but identified two other
men as the probable killers."' Patterson claimed that, after the first statement,
the detective yelled and spit at him, struck him in the head and lied to him about
evidence that the police had found."' Patterson asked to see a lawyer and to talk
to his grandmother but was denied.5 9 He cried throughout the second interroga-
tion.' 6° The detective wrote the second statement in which Patterson confessed
to killing his cousins and Patterson did not read it until after he signed it.161 At
trial, the judge denied Patterson's attempt to call a witness who, in a different
case, had been coerced into giving two false statements bythe same detective. 62
150. Atkis, 122 S. C. at 2252 n.25.
151. State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722 (La. 1977).
152. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L Radelet Misamiaga q ]wtiz inPamf!y Cv" ones,
40 STAN. L REV. 21, 157 (1987).
153. Maurice Possley&Steve Mills, DNA TatRul aCkRomi rnmta; LawefrMmPim
toAsk Caat for 7rFnawo 0I. Thin., Nov. 14,2001, at 1.
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Absent this evidence, the jury believed the detective and convicted Patterson.
Patterson's second statement was the only time he wavered about his
innocence."' It seems probable that this seventeen-year-old boy was executed
because of a confession, obtained while he was crying and asking for his grand-
mother, that he neither wrote nor read before signing.
V. CQ dmiom
In A tkim, the United States Supreme Court declared that the execution of
the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court determined
that an evolving standard of decency demonstrated that the practice was cruel
and unusual punishment. The Court also found that the diminished capacities
of mentally retarded defendants decreased their culpability; making the death
penaltyunwarranted. Also, because of these characteristics, the execution of the
mentally retarded did not further anypenological purpose of capital punishment
and could be carried out only at great risk of a mistaken execution. These same
facts support a prohibition against the juvenile death penalty. The actions of
state legislatures and juries and the opinions of the international community,
professional and religious organizations, and the American public illustrate an
evolving standard of decency and national consensus against the practice.
Juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders and, therefore, do not
deserve a punishment that is reserved for only the most morally blameworthy
murderers. Juveniles possess limited knowledge and experience, act on impulse
and disregard long-term consequences in a manner that subjects them to a grave
risk of execution when theyare innocent or their crimes do not rise to the capital
level These facts compel the determination that the juvenile death penalty is
unconstitutional and that another execution of a juvenile offender would be one
more too many. The dissenting justices of Pawson and In re Stafrd recognize
this fact. It is time to reconsider Stx#on and find the shameful practice of the
juvenile death penalty unconstitutional
163. Anerican Bar Association NetworkJum DuPPak) TcoritoPatnsro, sipm note 2.
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